So Hu opted to bide his time, looking for the right opportunity to pounce. He first launched an anticorruption drive in Beijing, Tianjin and within the ranks of the Chinese Navy. Then in August, news emerged of a $1.25 billion social-security-fund scandal in Shanghai. Soon after, Hu flattered Jiang with an effusive launch for the former president's new book. But more than 100 Beijing investigators poured into Shanghai, arresting one of Chen's close aides. Unusually damning details surfaced in the country's leading financial magazine, Caijing, about how unnamed senior city leaders had illegally pumped citizens' pension money into bum real-estate projects. Two weeks ago, Hu installed a new paramilitary police chief in Shanghai, where the head of public security happens to be Jiang's nephew (who is now also being questioned). "They had to stop officials from fleeing," says one Communist Party newspaper editor, who requested anonymity because he's not authorized to speak to foreign media. "And they definitely couldn't depend on just the police." Chen, because of his suspected involvement in the pension-fund scandal, has been sacked from all his party posts in what is the highest-level purge in China in more than a decade.
说实话这真的不是对一个国家（政党）维持廉洁反对腐败行动的一种负责任的表述，简直是一部骑士时代的宫廷政变小说。虽然我并不否认有时候现实比小说更为离奇精彩，但这毕竟是一个政府行为。这就像我虽然会批评、反对甚至叛逆我的家庭，但我并不希望我的家人在外人看来是一个笑话。但现实就是如此，甚至更糟糕，这让我觉得并不好受。而在对现实寥寥数语之后，文章就像所有境外文字一样，进入了党争论的部分。
Aside from the corruption issue, Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao have long clashed with the Shanghai faction over economic policy. They've championed policies aimed at closing the country's alarming rich-poor gap and providing more assistance to the impoverished hinterland. This was not the priority of the Shanghai faction, which represents the interests of China's booming coast. Chen—described by some as loutish and abrasive—laid bare both factional and regional tensions at a June 2004 Politburo meeting. There, he blamed the central government's use of macroeconomic controls to curb development for hurting the economies of coastal provinces. He rattled off statistics on how they were hobbling Shanghai's growth in particular.At that meeting Chen confronted Wen, and warned that the prime minister and his cabinet would have to "bear the political responsibility'' should the restrictions trigger a crisis of unemployment and bankruptcies. Hu interrupted to reiterate the central government's position. Still, Shanghai's economic growth rates continued to soar, hitting 13 percent last year.
你看看，政治局会议都写得身临其境了，这，这，这还有王法吗？ 继而作者在分析了一通党争前后开始谈起了关于继任的问题。
Who is Hu's favorite? There isn't just one. In fact, he appears to be grooming many protégés from the tuan pai—the Communist Youth League network loyal to Hu. The best bets to replace him are known as the "two Li's"—Liaoning province party boss Li Keqiang and his counterpart in Jiangsu province, Li Yuanchao (they're unrelated). In the early 1980s, both were Hu's lieutenants in the Youth League. Both hold law and economics degrees. Both are said to be steady leaders and know each other quite well, having co-authored a book on economic reforms at Beijing University in the mid-1980s.
你没有看错，就是“团派”。 具体分析的胡说八道就不列了。
接下来的准备结束显得四平八稳、波澜不惊，所以这篇文字才会在这里出现，而非被我当作敌对势力的反动言论给过滤掉。
The Shanghai corruption crackdown provides clues on what to expect from Hu's second term—and from the leaders who follow him. Hu aims to put together a vast social-security fund—"lifesaving money," as China's state media call it—and use it to assist the urban unemployed and to subsidize education and health care for rural peasants. But Hu's economic populism doesn't mean that he's a progressive. While the Chinese president pays lip service to the rule of law, he's not likely to take any significant steps toward true political reform—meaning multiparty elections, an independent judiciary, a genuine Fourth Estate or other hallmarks of constitutional democracy. For now, Hu's priority is the party's political survival. Indeed, as part of the latest CCP rectification campaign, according to the party editor, cadres are being ounded up to watch a lengthy agitprop television series documenting how the Soviet Union collapsed.
文章最后一点引用了一名官员的话，“the country desperately needs political reform to go along with economic development. Otherwise, China will fall into social crisis.”这也是老生常谈，了无新意。说实话我并不完全同意党争论对这件事的评价，当然，更不会是反腐论的拥护者。但我觉得境外媒体在这件事上的评价对我们还是有借鉴意义的，至少在梳理这些不同声音的时候，我们在思考，而非被愚弄。如果不同意，我可以反对，可以辩驳，而不是沉默。相对于这篇文章，
Dan Harris 的评论也许才是让我有上述郁闷感觉的真正原因：
I do not know enough about the intricacies of Chinese politics to know if all of the facts and conclusions in the article are accurate, but I know enough about communist and oligarchical politics in general to know that the various scenarios are eminently plausible.
此外，以上文章并不完全，希望看全文的朋友可以点击上面的链接去试试。
最后我想说说
火星帖的解释（
http://jzclub.xihai.com/bin/jzclub_smile-message-4.html），关于陈的火星帖
一个是新疆的大牛罗列的听其言 观其行（
http://www.daynew.net/?p=184），
一个是柴静的旧闻一则（
http://www.bullog.cn/blogs/chjguancha/archives/17775.aspx）,这里要说明一下，柴MM的旧闻在新闻门户新浪并不招待见，被过滤掉了，除了对柴MM的幼稚无知表示遗憾和同情外，我们也应该珍惜这个来之不易的网络环境，自觉抵制不良信息，营造和谐网络。
相关链接
陈良宇事件：
http://my1996.blogspot.com/2006/10/blog-post_04.html
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